1
Why "Saving" democracy?

To write a book that includes in its title the idea of saving democracy edges towards the melodramatic. Yet there is widespread concern among scholars and in popular commentary that citizens have grown more distrustful of politicians, skeptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned with democratic processes or even principles. According to the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, in a speech delivered in 2018:

> *Trust is at a breaking point. Trust in national institutions. Trust among states. Trust in the rules-based global order. Within countries, people are losing faith in political establishments, polarization is on the rise and populism is on the march.*

There is evidence from many countries of a loss of confidence in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of national governments, as well as political parties, the news media and interest groups, some of the core institutions linking citizens and the state. These decaying institutions provide the connection to our understanding of how democracies end, as they are no longer as effective at connecting governors and the governed. The risks of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence are such that many observers see democracy in 'retreat', 'recession', or in a 'reverse wave' around the world, losing the war of ideas compared to the Chinese governance model or a newly assertive Russia. Some fear that weak commitment to the democratic norms and rules of the game by political leaders means we are entering an era in which 'democracies die'.

The world is at a crossroads, with tyranny a more likely path forward than the renewal of democracy. Larry Diamond who has spent his career defending and promoting democracy captures the mood with his usual style.

> *In every region of the world, autocrats are seizing the initiative, democrats on the defensive, and the space for competitive politics and free expression is shrinking. Established democracies are becoming more polarized, intolerant, and dysfunctional. Emerging democracies are facing relentless scandal, sweeping citizen disaffection, and existential threats to their survival.*

There are significant challenges, according to Diamond, in saving democracy from the threat of Russian aggression, Chinese power and the failings of the leader of democracy, the United States of America. However, the most pressing challenge and potential tipping point to either democratic renewal or inertia is posed by post-COVID-19 recovery.

**Post-COVID-19 recovery – democratic inertia or renewal?**

Although it is still too early to predict the degree of economic dislocation caused by the pandemic, most serious economists are predicting a recession that dwarfs in scale

the Great Depression or Global Financial Crisis. As as we write, fears are growing that the downturn could be far more punishing and long lasting than initially feared largely due to the distinctive nature of the pandemic and its impacts. The fear of the spread of the virus has reconceptualised how we understand public space, stagnating consumer-led business activity and economic growth. As long as human interaction remains dangerous, business, government and society cannot responsibly return to normal. The consequent abrupt halt in commercial activity and dramatic increases in unemployment will impose economic pain so profound in every region of the world that recovery could take years. And yet at the same time many governments around the world are rising to the challenge and rediscovering their raison d'etre – collective problem-solving in the national interest.

We have witnessed a renaissance in public faith in science and evidence informed policy-making. Even the media has enjoyed renewed confidence in its reporting, particularly public broadcasters. Most significantly, after a decade of disappointment with digital democratic innovation, governments and citizens around the world are beginning to embrace opportunities for digital participation. More and more citizens appear to be up for digital citizenship than ever before. And, governments are increasingly recognising the need to institutionalise citizen voice in pandemic recovery processes.

COVID-19 has reminded voters that national governments are necessary and that with systemic renovation they can be made to work. Polling data from @MorningConsult shows that where national leaders have not completely bungled their pandemic response the popularity of elected leaders has risen (see Figure 1.1). A classic expression of the well-known "rally around the flag" effect at times of national crisis which my not be sustained but it perhaps provides a window of opportunity?

Figure 1.1: The popularity of democratic leadership during COVID-19 response in 10 countries

Political leaders around the world have begun to talk about new thinking on the other

side of the pandemic. Earlier references to a "snap-back" have given way to a realisation that what is needed is a much more root-and-branch approach, to taxation, transfer payments, industry policy, regulation, and across all of these areas, the relative roles of governments and markets. Moreover, the argument in support of driving national conversations on democratic renewal when public trust is strong and before austerity bites is a great one.

Of course, a note of caution is appropriate here. Old politics is not dead and will make a strong bid for return. But could we be entering a golden era for democratic renewal or the return of old politics? And how can we imagine this process of recovery and renewal?

A golden age for democratic renewal

We take the arguments of doomsayers about democracy seriously, but our approach is focused less on lamenting the problem or the international context and much more at looking at how people in democracies are searching for solutions. Our commitment to this approach is driven by recognition that both the idea and practice of democracy is not exclusively a product of geo-politics or good political leadership; it is strongly influenced by a social base of citizens with the resources to engage politically and committed to emancipatory values. What sustains democracy is citizens with the capacity to organise and act politically with the necessary skills, cognitive ability and networks and an embedded commitment to the freedoms and rights of all citizens. That capacity to act and commitment to the values of freedom is not evenly spread across all regions – it is largely but not exclusively to be found in the established and some newer democracies. But from our perspective it provides the seedbed for the renewal of democracy. The future of democracies as much of its past – depends on people finding ways to make it work for them.

Rather than add to the litany of woe and anxiety, our objective in choosing the phrase "saving democracy" to adorn our book is to indicate a sense of optimism and hope. Our argument is that democracy is always in a process of remaking itself and it can create positive trends as much as negative ones. Reformers however need to not get fixated on one type of reform – for example citizens' assemblies – and look at the issue in the round. Democracy is best understood as a system which has inputs, throughputs and outputs and if you want to transform the system then you must address all the working parts.

Systems of democratic governance have three broad tasks: to discover the best interests of the governed, to decide and make choices among those interests and then to act to support those interests. To save democracy political systems need to get better at all three tasks.
There are other books that deal with the issue of democratic innovation. These works have many qualities, but they focus rather narrowly on the input side of politics: about how to get citizens more involved in making decisions about what should be done. But we need to consider innovations that are not just about setting the agenda of politics but also transform the way governments decides and then act.

Our argument is premised on the idea that there is a need to look at reforms across the

whole of the political system. With the emergence of the systematic turn in deliberation theory some attention has been paid to the various institutional arrangements driving decisions in political systems (e.g. parliaments, media, and experts) but we would still consider what is on offer as a half turn rather than a full turn. Developing a system understanding should focus on how the throughputs of politics are managed and how the practices of delivery are experienced. Both of which are as important, arguably, to citizens' experience of democratic politics as the input side of politics.

A second theme is about connecting old and new power. Linking politicians and the political system back to citizens is at the heart of our strategy to "save" democracy. Old power is the familiar in a democracy: elected politicians, assemblies making laws, courts ensuring the rule of law and governments trying to deliver services and gets things done. New power is about citizens taking up a role beyond their traditional role of voting in elections. Why do many democracies appear to be facing pressures to make change in that direction? There is a lot of evidence to indicate that citizens are turning away from an allegiant towards a more assertive approach to politics. In doing so they have become more distrustful of politicians and governments and willing to confront them and make demands. The argument points to a trend rather than a transformation achieved, but given the scale of developments it is implausible to imagine the genie being put back in the bottle. More positively by linking the dynamic and flexible new power of citizens to political systems, old power can be enabled to deliver public goods and services more effectively.

A third theme for this book is that exemplars and archetypes matter. Our book will be full of examples of practice as part of our aim is to show that changing democracy is happening and not a utopian hope. Our goal is to identify where there is a track record of practice and identify prospects for progress. Practice also matters because formal rules about democracy can provide guidance but good experiences and evidence of change on the ground provide an additional motivation for change but also a stronger understanding of how to do it. Bad practice can undermine a good idea. Public participation or consultation has been rightly seen as a way of improving democracy but research shows that one of the biggest deterrents for participation is citizens' perception of a lack of response from official consultation schemes, often described as consultation fatigue. Officially sponsored consultation has too often been blighted by asking for public engagement when decisions have already been made, or where there is no commitment to respond to the ideas that are generated.

What are democracies? And why are they worth saving?

The scope of the book is focused on all countries struggling to make democracy a reality. We deploy the characterisation of democracy used by the Varieties of Democracy Institute that recognises that democracies are made from a mix of components and different countries may have more or less of each of these elements in practice. The first of these features is the "electoral element" which measures a country on how consistent, open, fair, free and contested are its elections. The "participatory element" asks how many legal channels of participation a country offers its citizens, from the local to the national level, and how easy it is for the citizens to use these channels. Finally, the "liberal component" judges the extent of civil rights,

including minority rights, as well as the extent that power is spread within the systems and that there are checks and balances to limit the power of any one actor.

If all three of these components are present in high quality, then that country can be defined as a *liberal democracy* and forms part of the central focus of this book. There were in the second decade of the twenty first century about forty countries that met these criteria sufficiently, according to the Varieties project. But in addition, the Varieties project also identifies a larger number of *electoral democracies* (over fifty countries) that are substantially democratic but fall short in some way of meeting the third test, based on the liberal component. These countries also form part of our study; indeed, some examples of democratic innovation can be observed in these electoral democracies. Combining liberal and electoral democracies gives us coverage of about half the countries in the world. The other half of countries fall into the category of being autocracies; regimes where rulers are not accountable to citizens. The Varieties project draws a broad distinction between open and closed autocracies. In the former, elections take place and leaders and other representatives are voted for but limits to levels of competition, media freedom and the rule of law take away much of the power of the electoral process. In closed democracies open elections are not part of the governing process. While these countries are not a central focus for our work they may, nevertheless, offer insights on how to improve democracy, especially as there are often forces from civil society (campaigners, human rights activists and community based groups) trying to make the case for democracy or develop democratic practices.

No system of categorization is without problems and limitations. The allocation of specific countries to a category within the Varieties project might be justifiably questioned or debated. But given our theme is about "saving democracy" it does imply that our focus is on those countries that have something to save rather than something to establish. Therefore, for the purposes of our argument, the societies we are primarily concerned with are liberal and electoral democracies. When we refer to democracies in this book, we mean to capture both types.

There are a range of instrumental and intrinsic arguments that can be made for the value of democracy, even if it's a rather imperfect and often disappointing process. The instrumental argument comes in a variety of forms. Democracy can be defended as an effective and legitimate mechanism for reconciling people who hold different interests and values, without resort to violence. Given that the world is always likely to be full of disagreements and conflicts then having a way of resolving those disagreements without people killing each other is of value. More positively, it can be argued that democracy helps in the search for solutions to shared problems and focuses the minds of rulers on the welfare of citizens, as they require their votes.

There are powerful intrinsic arguments for democracy. Christian Welzel argues that 'democracy as a tool of human empowerment whose primary purpose is to entitle people to master their own lives and to give them a voice and vote'. Elizabeth Anderson extends this understanding by noting that beyond its instrumental virtues democracy 'is a culture or way of life of a community defined by equality of membership, reciprocal cooperation, and mutual respect and sympathy and located in civic society'. Democracy expresses the sense that each citizen is of equal worth and

deserves to have their voice heard and their freedoms respected. Beyond that it enables people to engage in the noble art of finding mutually agreeable solutions to shared problems. Democracy expresses both the human desire to protect and promote your values and interests but also demands empathy and engagement with others, making you a better person in doing so.

The value of a system approach – ten challenges facing democracy

The idea of thinking about politics as a system has a long pedigree. Gabriel Almond in 1956, for example, argued that the term "system": 'satisfies the need for an inclusive concept which covers all of the patterned actions relevant to the making of political decisions'. But it was David Easton that developed in 1965 one of the strongest statements for a systems perspective. We do not need to embrace all the features of Easton's perspective to still use some of the concepts he advanced. Political systems have *inputs* which in a broader sense is everything in the environment that goes into making a political choice. Inputs provide both demands on the system and support for either specific proposals or more generally diffuse or generalized trust, indicating that the system is deemed legitimate. The legitimacy of a political system depends on how much all citizens feel that all voices are heard and if there are opportunities for them to have access to influence. But as Vivien Schmidt argues legitimacy is also determined by the *throughput* part of the political system. Throughput refers to those actors (politicians, bureaucrats, experts and stakeholders) that are tasked with making governing decisions and 'encompasses the myriad ways in which the policy-making processes work both institutionally and constructively to ensure' efficacy, accountability and transparency in the making of those decisions. The final element in our system take on politics is the concept of *outputs*, broadly what the system produces. Outputs are about the effectiveness of delivery, the responsiveness of services and performance to societal need and the values of what is delivered, whether for example people are treated with respect and fairness. Bo Rothstein has argued about the importance of not forgetting 'the public administration side of the equation… what goes on at the "output" side of the political system has empirically been shown to be most important for creating political legitimacy'.

We argue that the challenges facing democracies can be reflected in the problems in establishing legitimacy across the system: inputs, throughputs and outputs. Table 1.1 capture our sense of some of the major issues that have challenged democratic governance in recent decades and have potentially become more acute as a consequence of the impacts of COVID-19. We start with the input side of politics with two really major issues. Social inequality and lack of access remain a challenge for many democracies and has arguably become greater in a digital world. A second challenge is the issue of the media environment and the way that a sense of shared political community is difficult to maintain if citizens talk past one another or are diverted by fake news. A third input concern is about how best to organise citizen participation so that it avoids fatigue, knee-jerk responses and a sense of lack of real control. Finally, on the input side, the core democratic institutions of political parties and elections need to do their job better.

When it comes to throughputs there are several issues that need to be addressed by reformers. There are three we think are particularly worthy of attention. The first is the

way that politics is conducted in assemblies and parliaments and the wider relationship to the system of governing. There is something odd about the culture of politics and there are substantial concerns around the representativeness of elected politicians. Are they drawn from a wider enough base? Do they reflect the nature of the society they claim to speak for? Do they work in a way that promotes public engagement and understanding?

Table 1.1: The political system – ten problems confronting democracies

Inputs: the framing of political demands	
Problem	**Issues**
1. Unequal Political Community	Democracy tacked on to an unequal society with structural disadvantages limiting the full engagement of several groups including most women, many ethnic and indigenous minorities and other groups in society who lack the resources to believe that they can engage effectively
2. Weak Basis for Shared Political Community	Politics involves competition and conflict but the emerging polarised and post-truth context for politics threatens the shared ground that is needed for dialogue and compromise. Competition driving the search for controversy by mainstream media and the weaponization of social media and the use of artificial intelligence are adding to negativity and division
3. Lack of citizen voice and opportunity to engage effectively	Public consultation schemes are now an everyday practice, but they suffer from a sense of pointlessness and fatigue. The challenge is to find ways of critical citizens to take engagement further or deeper?
4. Lack of trust in parties and elections; yet they remain pillars of mainstream democratic practice	Parties and elections are the mechanisms that feed representative democratic institutions but are struggling to match the growing divisions in society, declining membership in parties and participation in elections suggest they are not functioning effectively or sustaining public trust

Throughputs: making decisions	
Problem	**Issues**
5.Representative assemblies do their politics in ways that many find alienating or pointless	Out of date procedures, rules and culture; need to be better at holding executive branch of government to account; lack of capacity for long-term policymaking; more engagement with the public and less grandstanding
6.Decisions made with lack of evidence, forward thinking and public purpose cost legitimacy	Policies need to be desirable but also feasible and that requires open exchange between politicians and administrative and technical experts, but too often evidence-based policymaking is undermined by lack of trust, pressures of short-termism and lack of communication
7.Cross boundary and multi-level problems do not fit easily within the confines of democracies designed around nation states	Many key issues (climate change, tackling pandemics or obesity) require action at many levels of government both within nation states and beyond. But the practices of multi-level government remain fraught with difficulty. Mixing decentralisation and devolution of power with the pooling of sovereignty with other nation states is not straightforward. In federal and unitary systems institutional forms designed in one era are not necessarily the right ones for a new era.

Outputs: delivery	
Problem	**Issues**

8. Policy and interventions are failing at the design level without engagement from citizens and stakeholders	Designing the implementation of policies without the engagement of users or co-producers can limit effectiveness. The challenge is to develop citizen-centred design techniques that are suitable
9. Making everyday bureaucracy better matters which means improving effectiveness, avoiding corruption and delivering a service that is fair and respectful	There is evidence that problems in implementation undermine trust and discourage citizen to expect much from government. Yet there are good reasons why a bureaucracy that is both efficient and effective and fair and responsive is difficult to deliver
10. Developing long-term governance capacity matters so that major issues such as climate change can be addressed	Good governance requires working across sectors, boundaries and beyond the short term.

A second arena to look for reform is at the heart of the machine where policy decisions are forged and framed. Is the policy process getting access to the right ideas, experts and evidence?

The third concern is about how governing processes work across national and regional boundaries. Policy problems have a habit of never being entirely located at local, regional, national or global levels and mostly require intervention at all levels but are governing arrangements capable of delivering that kind of flexibility, collaboration and partnership?

And then of course, it is all very well to have good policies, but they make no difference unless they can be delivered effectively. Here too democracies face challenges and demands for reform. The practices of programme and service delivery design need to be improved. State institutions and bureaucracies need to be better at treating citizens with fairness, equity and respect. Governing bodies also need to be able to win citizen trust in order to govern in the long-term. These three challenges demand major reform commitments.

The ten challenges also give us ten ways to save democracy and provide the focus for the bulk of the chapters in the remainder of this book. We will explore various reform options that in some way respond to the challenges outlined in Table1.1 and ask what it is about them that can make a difference and contribute to an underlying theory of change. We will draw on evidence from practices across a range of countries and locations. And, we will ask of each reform: what are the prospects for generalized and sustained roll-out? These questions will provide a shared analytical framework for our examination of ways to save democracy.

Merging old power and new power

One reason why democracy needs to change is that people and the way they engage with each other have changed from the founding decades of mass democracy over a hundred years ago. Citizens are now better educated and more critical. We live in a world that is more globally connected and intertwined challenging one of the building blocks for modern democracy, the nation state. Societies whether they like it or not are more strongly impacted by global events and globally driven rules and oversight. We have access to information, news and opinion in a way that is speedier and more multifaceted than was imaginable even a few decades ago. The main institutions of politics have not fared well in this changed context and political leaders have in their adaptions to the new environment made politics more a focus of distain and distrust. We will explore these issues further in Chapter 2 when considering what has gone wrong with democracy in practice. But for now, the rise of "critical" citizens in part drives our sense of optimism about the prospects for positive change and we should develop that idea a little further.

A way of capturing the issue is that we are shifting from an allegiant to an assertive culture. Table 1.2 expresses some of the key features of this dynamic of change. The development of easier access to education and wider social change have led to 'cognitive mobilisation' a process by which education levels and political skills drive both lower trust in government and the emergence of new, less elite-directed forms of political action. Pippa Norris argues that citizens across much of the world – and especially younger citizens – continue to support regime principles (democracy as an ideal form of government) but have withdrawn support from regime institutions (the performance of parties, parliaments, governments). These processes are combined with the impact of partisan dealignment so that citizens are less tied to a mainstream party and more likely to display volatility in their voting preferences. These disconnecting forces create a political landscape where political parties can rely less on loyalty and must attract voters by claims of competence or as in the case of populists by exploiting resentment.

Table 1.2: The key features of allegiant and assertive civic cultures

Allegiant	Assertive
Emphasis on order and security	Emphasis on voice and participation due to rising inequalities
Deference to authority	Distance from authority
Trust in institutions	Scepticism of institutions
Limited liberal view of democracy	Expanded democratic expectations
Limited protest/protest potential	Direct, elite challenging action
Traditional forms of participation	Mixture of traditional and new forms of participation

Source: developed from Welzel and Dalton (2014)

But let us immediately add some caveats. It is possible that the extent of deference that existed in the past to those in authority from democratic citizens could be over-emphasised. In a study with colleagues published in 2018 we found that in the UK at least:

> *...no golden age of political support existed. Even in the immediate post-war period, substantial proportions of the population disapproved of governments and prime ministers (whatever their political persuasion). They thought politicians to be out for themselves and their party (as opposed to their country). They associated political campaigning with vote-catching stunts, mud-slinging, and a focus on personalities over policies. They imagined politicians to be self-seeking 'gasbags'.*

Yet notwithstanding the idea that citizens have always been critical of politicians, the shift in focus among citizens has been towards a concern with their rights and their voice. The default position in democracies is trending towards being sceptical rather than trusting.

Citizens are better educated and less deferential, on average, and they have access to a wider range of sources of information and media. They expect to have a say in matters that affect them and are more open to using a range of participatory tools to get their message across. These trends may all help to deliver democratic empowerment. On the demand side of the equation, the capacity of citizens to act democratically is present to an unprecedented degree, although significant issues of inequality in access to resources and capacity to mobilise can still be observed. It can be argued that the 'erosion of allegiant cultures and the parallel emergence of assertive cultures should not be worrisome developments as regards the societies' governance performance. Instead, in terms of both accountable and effective governance, the cultural change has positive consequences'.

More citizens are up for their role as active participants and more equipped then in the past to do so. The demand for a more empowering politics is strengthening and better fuelled. The conditions for effective democracy could in this light be a positive trend. There are, however, some important qualifications to this claim (not least over levels

of inequality in access to politics) that will be explored later in the book. In many democracies, the sense of belonging to a successful "national" project is being questioned as income inequality widens. There are increasing numbers of people who are either completely economically marginalised, or feeling economically insecure, fearful for their jobs in an age of continual restructuring, cost containment and casualization. Old power structures can no longer deliver on the promise of social inclusion.

But for now, let's focus on the positive. Citizens are becoming more assertive. That provides an opportunity. The irony is, as Cas Mudde comments, that:

> *...In many ways, only now the population is what democratic theorists have long prescribed: a collection of critical and independent citizens. This means that they have to be convinced of political programs and only give their support conditionally and temporarily. They hold politicians accountable, punishing them if they don't do (everything) they promised'.*

The negative is that the supply side of politics, mainstream politicians, political parties and political institutions have not reacted well to this shift. The political system has failed to provide the opportunity structures for participation demanded by a newly assertive democratic culture.

Does this failure of the traditional political class point to the end of politicians and parties as we know them? Versions of this argument are advocated in less brutal and more intelligent ways by some. One proposal that is gaining traction – given the name sortation – is for democracy *without elections or politicians*. Instead of voting to select representatives, democracies would use random selection across the population to choose rotating groups of deciders. There is an excellent web site hosted by the Sortition Institute that explains these ideas and claims growing popularity for them. Its co-founder Brett Hennig comments, 'if you think democracy is broken, here's an idea: let's replace politicians with randomly selected people'. We think there is something of real value in getting citizens more involved in this way but do not think that democracies would solve their problems by getting rid of politicians. Instead we want to reconnect politicians with their publics.

One question that sortition advocates struggle to convincingly answer is who will oversee the delivery of public services and programmes once random selections of citizens have made their decisions about what they want. Who will make sure the military, the police, bureaucracy, regulators, government agencies, private contractors and non-profits deliver what was promised? It is difficult to deny that a relatively stable group of citizens with experience and administrative and expert support would be best placed to do that job. In a traditional political system, they are, of course, the elected politicians. These holders of old power have not always been great at doing the job of detailed direction and oversight to ensure delivery, but it cannot be denied that that they are attempting to perform important roles.

Political systems, including those in democracies, rely on old power. Old power is based on *controlling* structures, specialism and oversight. The governing system that operates in most democracies runs through the application of old power, with control

supposedly ultimately resting in the hands of citizens. At any election citizens choose politicians, the politicians in turn oversee public officials, bureaucracies and government agencies with all their multiple branches, experts and specialisms. The politicians decide the detail of policy   with the advice of officials and officials make it happen. If citizens are not happy with the outcomes, if they think that politicians have not done their job well, then citizens remove them from office at the next election. That in a nutshell is the main story we tell ourselves about how democracy is supposed to work. Democracy has been premised to a large degree on this old power understanding but in practice delivering control for citizens has proved to be illusive.

Indeed, we would go further and argue that the idea of control by citizens of governing processes in complex societies is illusory. Given, "take back control" was a theme in the Brexit vote in the UK and is a mantra shared by many populist movements some might argue that reforms that give control to citizens should be the leitmotif of reform. Populism today finds its most common expression inside democracies and has in most cases forged a relationship with democratic institutions. These modern forms of populism do not propose to abolish free elections or install dictatorship: on the contrary, their demand is for a democracy that 'delivers what the people want'.

One objection to "put the people in control" is that the underlying issue that blocks this reform path is that it is undeliverable. In a world that has become more globalized, inter-connected and subject to rapid technological change, control is no longer a tenable option. Yet many politicians still make promises of control but in doing so they ultimately stoke public disappointment with democratic politics. Another objection is that who "the people" are is not so clear cut in societies that have become more fragmented by geographical mobility, patterns of immigration and greater respect and support for diversity.

If democracy cannot deliver control as much as the old power framework promises what can citizens expect? Our answer is influence through new power and our focus is on reforms that promise to citizens not control but capacity for creativity. *If old power is based on control through formal structures new power is based on making connections of influence through systems that are relatively short-lived, informal and open.*

In terms of democracies some of the leading new power developments include the rise of rapid sharing internet based campaigns that make a campaign point (i.e. petitions that attract millions of signatures within hours), political parties that lack formal memberships but offer a platform where citizens can join and engage on the issues they care about, the use of the internet to spread and deliver messages by political leaders (e.g. President Trump's use of Twitter).

But new power is not restricted to developments in digital politics. New power can be associated with any mechanism that provides an opportunity for an engagement with politics that is based on making a connection with others, agreeing to engagement but based on conditional affiliation and developing an intervention that is time specific and limited. Many of the reforms we examine in the book have these qualities.   New power is a way of doing politics that matches some of the development towards a

more assertive political culture. Citizens are looking for opportunities to get things done, to find their own solutions, individually and collectively. New power provides *a framework for doing* as it is driven by greater connectivity and enabling activity and characterised by open sharing, conditional affiliation and more overall participation.

Old power has not been dissolved, nor has it disappeared. We therefore want to focus on reforms that either work with the grain of new power or are hybrids that combine elements of old and new power. For example, the democratization of the parliamentary committee system to include lay public representation. This is a hybrid intervention that seeks to revitalise an old power institution of representative democracy by connecting up old and new power through public participation. The argument here is the need to move beyond old binaries that recognize the role that participation can play in bolstering the legitimacy and dynamism of representative democracy. Our goal is to work with the logic of new power to connect to old power.
Notes