

2 Can Democracy Be Saved?

Democracies confront a diverse range of problems. *The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020*¹ found that the share of people who express dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy had risen by 10 percentage points to 57.5 per cent, from 1995 to 2019. Whereas before, most citizens in countries in North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Australasia were satisfied with the performance of democracy that is no longer the case. The picture is undeniably mixed. Some smaller countries are reaching all-time highs in satisfaction such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway. But some of the most populous countries in world have seen the steepest decline in satisfaction as in the USA, Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria. In the older democracies, the symptoms of decline are seen in the growing polarization of politics where social and political divisions appear deep-seated, cultural and antagonistic, matched by the rise of populism and associated social movements and political parties and a wider sense of frustration with the capacity of politics to deal with the problems confronting society. In the newer democracies, after the enthusiasm that greeted the arrival of democracy, there has followed a less glorious period of politics, with governance mired by corruption, inter and intra-group conflict, and other failings that undermine democracy's appeal. The report concludes that 'across the globe, democracy is in a state of deep malaise'.²

There is no doubt that democracy needs to change. What is required to deliver the best democracy? Even a basic list of conditions presents a daunting picture. Citizens would need effective opportunities to get issues on the agenda for public discussion and decision. They would need to see themselves and their interests represented in political institutions. Their judgement, with equal weight, would count at each stage of the process of deciding. Their decision-making would reflect opportunities to access evidence and the chance to deliberate and detect fake news and information. Political institutions and elected officials would need to be responsive to decisions and competent and respectful in the implementation of those decisions. They would be driven by evidence and act to get things done with integrity, openness and with the best interests of citizens at the heart of their engagement. The media system would support free speech and a free flow of ideas. Long-term commitments would need to be legitimised and sustained to tackle major societal challenges.

It is helpful when talking about 'saving democracy' to recognise that 'every system purporting to be democratic is vulnerable to the charge that it is not democratic enough, or not 'really' or 'fully' democratic. The charge is bound to be correct since no polity has ever been fully democratized.'³ Democracy is a practice not a utopian ideal and it will always fall short of achieving all that people might want it to accomplish. Moreover, democracy works through humans and institutions, with all the flaws and failings regularly associated with these carriers of its creed. It operates in the context of social

and economic inequalities that undermine its operation and powerful threats from the forces of globalisation. It confronts, daily, hostile nation-based political forces that threaten it and its powers can appear fragile when faced with the challenges of, for example, climate change or COVID-19. But there remains hope. Citizens and politicians do fall short in practice, but they are not irredeemably condemned to fail. Democracy can be improved and made healthier and the challenge is to ‘learn by creating’, hence the celebration in this book of international examples of attempts to do just that. The malaise facing democracy is real but so too is the prospect of positive change.

This chapter examines how far citizens fall short of the democratic ideal but how much they can still contribute to democracy. The arguments against democracy premised on the limits of citizenship are not without force but they can be countered. It is arguable that it is the political elite (politicians and others at the top of the system) that are the greater threat to democracy and democratic reform. But even here, amongst the isolated political elite, we can find signs of hope. It is also important to recognize that institutions do exactly what they are designed to do – support certain norms, values and patterns of behaviour – so changing the institutional structure of politics is not an easy task but again it is possible.

Can citizens play their part in delivering democracy?

There would be little point in saving democracy if the main agents of democracy – citizens – were not up to the task. This is a vital consideration given we are proposing a greater role for citizens in the democratic process in some of the reform options we consider later in the volume. There are plenty of times that it has been suggested that the majority of citizens are so far from the ideal of the challenging, engaged, reflective actor that democracy demands that they should not have a leading role. But there is also robust evidence to suggest that citizens do find ways of making political choices that are good enough.

There is a strong and long-standing school of thought that is sometimes given the generic title of “competitive elitism”⁴ that in a broad sense argues that the complexity of modern civilisation and the failings of citizens mean that little scope can be given for direct citizen participation. Rather the role of citizens should be largely confined to choosing between competing leaders, with the democratic dynamic provided by the competition between these elites to win support. Max Weber in the early part of the 20th century made some considered points about the impracticality of large-scale participation as well making a more general argument for caution in how much should be expected of citizens given the complexity of the policy choices they face.⁵ In the aftermath of the rise of Hitler in Germany in the 1930s and 40s there was a shift in emphasis in the argument towards expressing fear about the implications of mass involvement in politics. Joseph Schumpeter expresses the argument in colourful terms:

'The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes primitive again'.⁶

There are 21st century versions of these arguments that still use colourful language. Bryan Caplan, for example, suggests that citizens indulge in fantasy and prejudice when engaging with politics.⁷ It is not irrational to do so because it carries few individual costs, compared to decision-making in other parts of their lives, where not considering confounding evidence or the value of trade-offs can be personally damaging. Voting, for example, is a trivial act because the probability of any one vote influencing an election outcome is low and the costs for an election outcome are not obviously apparent. There is obviously an element of truth in that argument, although the costs of many decisions are not easily known, or the trade-offs understood. Moreover, there are other major decisions (e.g. saving for retirement or buying a house) where the evidence is not overwhelming that citizens act primarily as rational, calculating actors.⁸ Jason Brennan observes that there are many citizens that are relatively unreasoning in their approach to politics.⁹ Like “hobbits” citizens can be apathetic and ignorant. The problem is that those that are more engaged tend to be highly partisan and with fixed world views. Brennan describes them as “hooligans”. Brennan’s solution is a variation on that offered in earlier versions of competitive elitism, a call for rule by the knowledgeable and experts.

Beyond these broad swipes at the role of citizens in democracy there are others who bring a range of evidence to the fore. Drawing on a range of experimental work James Kuklinski and Paul Quirk conclude that on many occasions the political decision-making of citizens suffers from significant flaws.¹⁰ One might expect a citizen to weigh policy-relevant information in a balanced way, but in practice they use stereotypes and embody misjudgements in their thinking. One might expect citizen to be knowledgeable about what they do not know, but in practice they are often wildly over-confident about their opinions. When new information becomes available a reflective thinker could be expected to take it on board and if appropriate change their view; however, citizens tend to be very resistant to the impact of new insights. When citizens engage in political debate, ‘hard’ arguments that demand time to absorb and some mental effort often lose out to ‘easy’ arguments that are emotive and simple and make strong claims without providing evidence. Citizens listen to political debates but make biased interpretations of the messages they receive. Finally, citizens are often poor at following through on the logical implications of their own reasoning. These negative perspectives are supported by the empirical analysis of Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels¹¹ who make a compelling observation about how American citizens lack the capacity for retrospective judgment regarding government performance:

'[w]e find that voters punish incumbent politicians for changes in their welfare that are clearly acts of God or nature. That suggests that their ability (or their inclination) to make sensible

judgments regarding credit and blame is highly circumscribed. In that case, retrospection will be blind, and political accountability will be greatly attenuated’.

Their overall assessment is damning, when they claim that election results are ‘*mostly just erratic reflections of the current balance of partisan loyalties in a given political system. In a two-party system with competitive elections, that means that the choice between the candidates is essentially a coin toss’.*

There is little point in trying to argue that citizens are always attentive to politics. Equally, it would seem obviously the case that when they are, they can miscalculate or be driven by broad partisan or ideological prejudices when making their judgements. Such is the problem of being human. We are fallible. So, what is the response of those who say that citizens can still do their job for democracy? The first rejoinder is that the way citizens make decisions is good enough. The second is to argue that when they want to, or more precisely, when they are given the opportunity, they can decide effectively by consuming and analysing more information.

Politics is carried out by humans and undertaken in a human way not according to some ideal model of the reflective, calibrating and committed citizen. Humans behave with respect to politics the way they do in most of the rest of their lives, as flexible thinkers responsive to their environment. Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues have developed the concept of ecological rationality to capture the idea that human reasoning is *adaptive* rather than *logical* in its motivation.¹² Humans think to adapt, act, and survive in complex environments. The best type of reasoning is the one that is most suited to the environment or task with which we are faced. Complexities in the environment and shortage of time have led to the human capacity for using fast and frugal heuristics that rarely follow the rules of formal logic, but which are nevertheless relatively successful. Moreover, the use of heuristics is not a second-best strategy, it is most often the best solution. Humans are not hopelessly prone to flaws in their decision-making, but rather adaptable thinkers and the success of their strategies revolve around matching heuristics to the task environment.

With only modest cognitive effort citizens can use cues from political elites to make reasoned choices that are a reliable guide to what they might choose if they had more information or put more cognitive effort into making the judgment. Elite actors provide the public with enough clues to make up their minds. But it is the voters who decide as they use endorsements from sources they trust to help them to decide between options.¹³ They are not just passive recipients of elite messages, they can choose to learn from neighbours, friends or family. They can also seek help from a range of sources.¹⁴ Political parties that capture the broad views and loyalty of voters can provide a cue to a voter that is enough for them to decide. If a political party is backing a preferred policy option, then the voter can feel comfortable with backing them. Partisanship or knowing you share a world view with others can help rather than hinder in the process of deciding.¹⁵ Equally, if a lobby group or association of which they are a supporter or member is campaigning on an issue (even backing an option in a referendum) then

the supporter or member will take that as a cue about how to decide. Citizens need relatively modest amounts of knowledge to make reasoned choices and the cues they adopt can provide a substitute for more detailed information.

Citizens can also be moved to make more cognitive effort. Affective or emotional experiences may focus people's attention on an issue or provide them with the appropriate cues to decide and can therefore be a functional asset in imperfect information contexts requiring modest cognitive effort.¹⁶ Kam shows that simply reminding citizens of their duty to reflect during campaigns can encourage citizens to think more about candidates and search more openly about issues: '[h]ow citizens think about politics is flexible, rather than fixed, and can be shaped in consequential ways by the nature of elite appeals during election campaigns'.¹⁷

Nor are citizens reliant on cues or nudges to get there thinking going. In Chapter 4 we will describe various forms of deliberative assemblies where citizens are randomly selected to participate just as they would be in the case of a criminal jury. Expert evidence, insight and analysis are provided to the citizens. In addition, they are given the time and opportunity to reflect, reason about, and challenge that input. The evidence from a range of these initiatives shows that the public can 'given the right circumstances, discuss with respect the views of others, change their minds in the light of evidence and argument, and reach judicious conclusions that take into account the public interest'.¹⁸

Are politicians able to deliver democracy?

There is in general, public suspicion that the wrong type of person is attracted to become a politician. In a test of which professions the British trust 'to tell the truth', survey evidence regularly place politicians in the lowest ranks. In 2019, they were indeed bottom of the table with a mere 14 per cent in comparison with those at the top such as nurses, and doctors who consistently get ratings in the mid-90s and University professors such as ourselves who get trust ratings in the mid-80s.¹⁹ So, who is attracted to become a politician? The short answer is not many of us.

In a study which combines survey data with detailed interviews, Jennifer Law and Richard Fox present a startling picture of how for most young citizens of the United States asking them if they want to become a politician is greeted with utter disdain.²⁰ The evidence leads them to conclude:

'Today's high school and college students have grown up knowing nothing other than a politics characterized by nasty campaigns, partisan posturing, a media establishment focused on conflict and scandal, and political pundits who perpetually stoke the flames of public anger and dismay. This is not the kind of environment conducive to fostering or nurturing thoughts of a political candidacy later in life'.

There is little in the way of a “pull” factor towards politics. There is also limited evidence of push factors at work either. Most parents hold that politics is too often about lying and cheating therefore they do welcome the idea that their children might enter an arena where the main actors lack honesty and ethics. In most families, politics is not discussed to any great degree’. In addition, in most households, politics is rarely discussed. There is no great encouragement perceived from the children from their parents to go down that career route and few children have strong political experiences to draw on. Broadly the view of both parents and children is that they would rather do anything else other than go into formal politics. If they are going to change the world, they do not see politics as the viable route to do so.

The pool from which elected politicians are drawn is small, primarily because many citizens and future citizens rule out a career in politics as an option for them. From that small pool of citizens who think that politics might be for them, a range of other biases come into play when it comes to getting into politics. Politics seems increasingly the preserve of those with specific professional backgrounds who can devote time and effort to becoming a career politician. As Pippa Norris observes ‘*in many countries amateurs who live for politics have been increasingly replaced by professionals who live from politics*’.²¹ This transformation reflects wider societal change:

*‘The state has been expanded and modernised. Occupations have been professionalised. Financial rewards for politicians – pensions, allowances, salaries – have been introduced and improved. Career opportunities for politicians have been expanded’.*²²

There are declining numbers of people coming to politics from another career (whether business, professional or manual working class) and increasing numbers of career politicians. The classic broker occupations that are still associated with politics such as lawyers, teachers, and managers have been joined by a more directly connected cadre of party workers, assistants, aides to elected representatives, think tank researchers, and special advisors:

*‘There has emerged a ‘political class’ comprised of politicians but also political consultants, advisers, researchers, and lobbyists, that is relatively homogeneous and well-connected internally, but relatively detached from citizens in wider society’.*²³

One other blatant bias is also worth mentioning. In most democracies there are more men than women in the role of elected representatives. Why? There are a few possible explanations. Is it the toxic nature of political culture and the way that men and the media in politics do not value the contribution of women? Is it the persistence of negative stereotypes about what women can do? Is it that the measures to create greater gender balance are just not working? Do political parties do enough to help women get elected? Or is it that somehow women choose not to engage or give priority to other forms of public service? It could be that there is something in each of these explanations, and that appears to be the view of citizens themselves. When asked ‘what is to blame for the under representation of women?’

responses from citizens in 27 European Union countries reveal some interesting insights. Political culture is the top factor identified and the third ranked factor is negative stereotypes, suggesting that structural factors beyond the control of women are to blame. But a significant amount of support is given to ideas about how the underrepresentation of women is their choice. A key difference is that women tend to focus on the structural factors more than men. What this potentially means for addressing issues of underrepresentation will be addressed further in the next chapter.

Table 2.1: Citizens views about where blame lies for under-representation of women in politics

Rank	Factor	% identifying (rounded up)
1	Political culture that devalues women and creates a negative environment	39
2	The choice of women is to go for other careers or activities	24
3	Negative stereotypes of what women can do limit engagement	20
4	Reforms and measures to address the issue have not be adequate	11
5	Parties do not give women the right opportunities	6

There is also some detailed evidence emerging on who political leaders are that confirms the sense that they are not representative of wider society. As part of a new leadership project John Gerring and colleagues have collected global evidence about who makes up the political elite in countries across the globe.²⁴ They include in their census members of the executive branch of government, the legislature, the judiciary, and others who hold sort form of informal power. They discovered in 2019 that: 81 per cent of the political elite are men; around a third speak English; and, around half were educated in the West. Only two per cent come from blue-collar occupational backgrounds or what might be called working class backgrounds.


In the introductory chapter we argued against the idea of replacing politicians as a group. We noted how strong advocates of sortition want to do away with politicians and replace them with randomly selected citizens to oversee political decision-making. We are not proposing to change our minds. But the evidence presented in this chapter that politicians come from a narrow pool and can form an isolated political class divorced from citizens gives pause for thought. Political elites are constructed in a way that leads to the under representation of half the population (women) and the near absence of those with blue collar jobs suggests that something is wrong with the socially representativeness of politics. Our view that politicians remain a vital part of delivering politics but the range and diversity of who becomes an elected politician has got to change if democracy is going to be saved. We shall return to all of these issues in Chapter 3.

So, when it comes to politicians is there hope? We think there is a case for optimism for three reasons. First it must be recognised that no political system is going to be perfectly representative of all parts of society. This is partly due to the imperfect nature of electoral systems and partly down to the distinctive skill sets involved in the representative's role and function in a complex environment. To argue that politicians are not representative fits with the idea that representation is about someone being present to represent someone else, the elected member or trustee who represents her constituents. But another way of thinking about the idea is that the task of representing involves more than being present and it has to be based on a claim to speak for others, that must be demonstrated and accepted, rather than a fact achieved by either being elected or reflective of a specific social group.²⁵ The challenge then becomes not to match politicians with the make-up of society but rather to ask are they able to represent the diverse interests of different groups in society effectively? Achieving equity in this second sense is by no means an easy task but it might be possible through the innovations presented in this book to make some progress.

A second reason why there is cause for hope is that we agree with Isabel Hardman in her book *Why We Get the Wrong Politicians*²⁶, that most politicians are not terrible people. They are often talented individuals who want to make a difference, undertaking an extraordinarily difficult job. There are probably more larger egos amongst a group of politicians than in other social groups; such is the performative nature of key aspects of the role. But many engage in politics to do something that in their opinion helps others. In most democracies, doing the job of the elected representative can involve long working hours and engagement in that activity can involve law-making, scrutiny of government, dealing with constituent concerns, meeting lobbyists and those who want their opinions to be heard, and media engagement. All that work is done in the context of intensive interest and sometimes commentary on their public and often private behaviour through both mainstream and increasingly social media. Government in a goldfish bowl takes place in a manner that is way beyond the experience of most of us.

In so far that there are behavioural issues with politicians, the issues are not about their character, in that they are as good or as bad as the rest of us. Not many of them are like TVs Frank Underwood from *House of Cards* and few come close to the politicians seen in *West Wing* or *Madam Secretary*. If we end up with bad politicians, as Hardman argues, it is in large part due to the institutions of politics, how they are selected, their behavioural norms and how their behaviour is rewarded. We can change the way those elements of the system of politics work and again some of the innovations we cover in this book address these issues.

Table 2.2: The good politician of the early twenty-first century



A third reason for hope is that citizens know what would make a good politician. Table 2.2 captures responses from a survey conducted in 2017 in Britain.²⁷ Let us focus on the characteristics that most view as ‘very important’ (these are marked in dark grey). It appears that the image of a good politician boils down to: someone you can trust (trustworthy, honesty, means what they say), who is competent (wise, strong, level-headed, works hard), someone who has integrity (sincere, genuine, principled) and someone who is in touch with the world around them (understands everyday life, in touch with ordinary people and comfortable mixing with them). It helps if you have personality, are inspiring, dress well and have had another job outside politics. But a good politician above all needs to be trustworthy, have integrity, be in touch and be able to get things done. That is of course a rather daunting list of characteristics for any individual to possess. But as a combined group, politicians should be able to deliver. It is possible to believe that we might be able to design a politics better suited to delivering on that ambition.

Can we design a better politics?

To change politics, we do not need to change human nature but rather change the institutions and systems used in politics. That is no easy task, but it is a more plausible ambition than changing human

nature. Yet some argue that designing better political institutions is a ‘mission impossible’ because it is not feasible to establish any clear understanding of cause and effect between intervention and outcome to guide our judgements. Lacking a complete model of causality does not however stop a commitment to reform in other areas of society and economy. Indeed, the way of working we would like to borrow from (admittedly more symbolically than substantially) comes from one of the frontiers of modern science: nanotechnology.²⁸ Scientists in that field are combining insights from physics, biology and chemistry to bring about a revolution in medical treatments. They are doing so through “learning by creating or making” by drawing on broad understandings of how things work but testing them with interventions that are in turn monitored and evaluated. Ultimately their goal is to design within medicine not the best average treatment for the average patient but instead to design medical interventions that are designed for an individual, matching their needs, DNA and circumstances. We want to draw on that spirit of learning through creating and we have many examples to draw on over the last decade as different countries and places have introduced successful interventions to improve the way politics works. Equally we do not think that all interventions are going to be the right ones for all democracies, but it might be possible, as in modern medicine, to begin to tailor solutions to countries or places.

We understand that all reforms are likely to face opposition. Albert Hirschman comments that opponents of change tend to frame their arguments along three lines.²⁹ Sometimes they claim that any change will jeopardise key valued elements of existing arrangements. At other times they argue that the reforms will be futile; they will not achieve their stated purposes. Finally, they argue that the reforms will have perverse, unintended consequences. None of these concerns is without substance. The first argument is a useful prompt to remember that any process of institutional design for democracy is unlikely to start with a blank sheet and must meet the challenge of being better than the existing system. We can perhaps be confident that reform, if done well, will preserve what is good in the current system and move us on to a better level of democratic practice. Hirschman’s last two arguments are more troubling, because they suggest that whatever we do, reform will not work and could even make things worse. The second argument gives in to fatalism. There are certainly good grounds for doubting whether intentional institutional change can be easily achieved. But there is no reason to rule out that idea if it can be delivered successfully. Moreover, it appears counterintuitive to think that liberal democratic systems forged through 19th century political values and institutions should remain unchanged in perpetuity. There is no other area of institutional development where that would be tolerated.

Change can of course have unintended consequences but again it seems wrong to assume that they will always be negative. The original designers of mobile phones added texting as an afterthought and were taken aback when it became more common than talking. Texting in its own modest way has contributed to the advancement of human exchange. Some modest reforms in politics may not always work as intended but may still achieve some benefit for democracy. A move to a proportional voting system, for example, where seats allocated in an assembly match support shown for a political party more

closely, has the virtue arguably of being seen as fairer by voters and as a way of encouraging citizens to vote as their vote counts. Indeed, turnout is on average higher in proportional systems. But equally it changes the behaviour of political parties. It makes them reach out to broader sections of society and this gives citizens the sense that their political system is more inclusive.

Institutions, however, are not permanent and are always in a state of flux. They achieve stability through the processes of influencing the way their members think and act. But these are human processes: surprise and shocks can drive change – good and bad – as COVID-19 illustrates. Citizens are getting more vocal in their demands for change. Politicians may think they are doing a good job but eventually it dawns on them – when no one else agrees – that they are not. The constant ‘drip’, ‘drip’ of such challenges can turn people from one way of understanding to another, stimulating radical change.

Conclusion – reimagining democracy

Is it possible to imagine a strategy for diagnosing and reforming politics? The answer provided in the rest of this book is that not only can we re-imagine democracy, but we can begin to provide an account of what it looks like. Saving democracy does not mean creating a utopian world but rather one that is better than the current one. Saving democracy does not demand the creation of a new group of super citizens but rather can rely on the capacities (modest as they sometimes are) of existing citizens. Saving democracy does not involve a new cadre of politicians. It may well require changes in where politicians are selected and drawn from and institutional incentives to ensure that they collaborate with and are more accountable and responsive to their electors but it does not require their wholesale replacement with a new group of randomly selected citizens. Finally, saving democracy, in the main, does not involve ideas drawn from the blue yonder or a journey to a place that is faraway, unfamiliar and mysterious. There are many successful examples of the practice of changing democracy to draw upon and it is to these that we now turn.

Notes

¹ Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Williams (2020), “The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020”, Centre for the Future of Democracy, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Retrieved 15 July 2020 from: <https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/publications/global-satisfaction-democracy-report-2020/>

² Foa *et al.*, p. 3.

³ This quotation is from one of the most respected theorists of democracy in the second half of the 20th century Robert Dahl in *After The Revolution? Authority in a Good Society*, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 4.

⁴ See David Held (2006) *Models of Democracy (Third edition)*, Cambridge, Polity Press, Chapter 5 for an extended review.

⁵ See Patrice Duran, ‘Max Weber and the Making of Politicians: A Sociology of Political Responsibility’, *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, Special Issue on *Max Weber and the Political*, pp. 51–93.

⁶ Schumpeter, J.A. (1942) *Capitalism, socialism, and democracy*, London, Harper & Brothers, p. 262.

⁷ Bryan Caplan (2007), *The Myth of the Rational Voter*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

⁸ See Peter John, Gerry Stoker and others (2019), *Nudge, nudge, think, think: Experimenting with ways to change citizen behaviour*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

⁹ Jason Brennan (2016), *Against Democracy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press. His views are captured in an interesting blog entitled ‘Politics makes us mean and dumb’. Retrieved 15 July 2020 from: <https://emotionresearcher.com/politics-makes-us-mean-and-dumb/>.

¹⁰ Kuklinski, J.H. and Quirk, P.J. (2000), ‘Reconsidering the rational public: Cognition, heuristics, and mass opinion’, in A. Lupia, A.D. McCubbins and S.L. Popkin (eds) *Elements of reason: Cognition, choice, and the bounds of rationality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 153–182.

¹¹ Achen, C.H. and Bartels, L.M. (2016) *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 15–16.

¹² For a relatively straightforward exposition of these ideas see Gerd Gigerenzer (2007), *Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious*, New York, Viking Press. And for further development of the argument see Gigerenzer, G. (2000), *Adaptive Thinking*, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Gigerenzer, G. (2008) *Rationality for Mortals*, Oxford, Oxford University Press; and, Gigerenzer, G. (2015), *Simply Rational*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

¹³ Lupia, A. (1994), ‘Shortcuts versus encyclopaedias: information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections’, *American Political Science Review* 88, pp. 63–76.

¹⁴ Kam, C.D. (2012), ‘The Psychological Veracity of Zaller’s Model’, *Critical Review*, 24, 4, pp. 545–567.

¹⁵ For an interesting discussion on this topic see Ezra Klein and Marc Hetherington debate ‘A new theory for why Republicans and Democrats see the world differently’ retrieved 15 July 2020 from: <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/18/18139556/republicans-democrats-partisanship-ideology-philosophy-psychology-marc-hetherington>

¹⁶ Marcus, G., Neuman, W.R. and MacKuen, M. (2000), *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press.

¹⁷ Kam, C.D. (2007), ‘When Duty Calls, Do Citizens Answer?’, *Journal of Politics*, 69, 1, pp. 17–29, p. 17.

¹⁸ Newton, K. (2012), ‘Making Better Citizens’ in Brigitte Geissel and Kenneth Newton, eds, *Evaluating Democratic Innovations*, London, Routledge, pp. 137–62 (p. 155).

¹⁹ For the evidence see the data retrieved 15 July 2020 from:

<https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-11/trust-in-professions-veracity-index-2019-slides.pdf>

²⁰ Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox (2015), *Running from Office: Why Young Americans are Turned Off Politics*, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 6.

²¹ Pippa Norris (1997), *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

²² Clarke, N., Jennings, W., Moss, J. and Stoker, G. (2019), *The Good Politician*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Gerring, J., Oncel, E., Morrison, K., & Pemstein, D. (2019), ‘Who Rules the World? A Portrait of the Global Leadership Class’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 17, 4, pp. 1079–1097.

²⁵ See Michael Saward (2010), *The Representative Claim*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

²⁶ Hardman, I (2018), *Why We Get the Wrong Politicians*, Atlantic books.

²⁷ *The Good Politician*, *op cit.*

²⁸ For an analysis of nanotechnology and its way of working aimed at the general reader see Contera, S (2019), *Nano Comes To Life*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

²⁹ Albert O. Hirschman was Professor of Social Science, Emeritus, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton University. Here we focus on his views presented in (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Boston, Harvard University Press.